MathsDecision Mathematics 2 › Game theory: play safe and stable solutions

Game theory: play safe and stable solutions

Two players, opposite interests, and one matrix of pay-offs. Ask what each can guarantee themselves, and the two answers either meet, settling the game, or they do not.

Year FMEDEXCEL 9FM0 D2

Builds on Dynamic programming and Probability and Venn diagrams.

IN THIS TOPIC

  • Read a pay-off matrix from the row player's point of view.
  • Find both play-safe strategies and test for a stable solution.
  • Reduce a matrix using dominance arguments.

WHAT YOU PROBABLY THINK

In a zero-sum game the column player wants the largest entries, since a large pay-off is good.

What each player can guarantee

The matrix is always written from the row player's point of view, so a positive entry is a gain to the row player and the same loss to the column player. Since one player's gain is the other's loss, the column player wants the entries small, which is what the opening claim reverses.

The row player's play safe choice looks at the worst outcome in each row and takes the row whose worst is best: the maximin. The column player looks at the largest entry in each column and takes the column whose largest is smallest: the minimax. Each is guarding against the other playing perfectly.

Row maximin 2 against column minimax 4: they differ, so the game has no stable solutionC1C2C3R13522R26141654row mincol maxmaximin 2 ≠ minimax 4: no saddle point
FIG. 1Row minima and column maxima for a two by three game, where the maximin of 2 and the minimax of 4 differ.

WORKED EXAMPLE

Finding the play-safe pair

For the game with rows (3, 5, 2) and (6, 1, 4), find both play-safe strategies.

Row minima are 2 and 1, so the row player's maximin is 2, playing R1.

Column maxima are 6, 5 and 4, so the column player's minimax is 4, playing C3.

The two differ, so the game has no stable solution: whichever pair is played, one player can improve by switching.

Stable solutions and dominance

A game has a stable solution, or saddle point, exactly when the row maximin equals the column minimax. Then neither player can do better by moving alone, that common number is the value of the game, and the pair of choices at which it occurs is the solution. When they differ, no single pair is stable, and mixed strategies are needed.

Before any of that, look for dominance. A row is dominated if another row is at least as good for the row player in every column, and a column is dominated if another is at least as good, meaning smaller, for the column player in every row. A dominated option would never be chosen, so it can be deleted outright, and repeating that often reduces a large matrix to a two by two.

A stable game: row maximin equals column minimax, so the value is 3 at R2 against C2C1C2C3R14252R26373637row mincol maxmaximin 3 = minimax 3: a saddle point
FIG. 2A game whose maximin and minimax are both 3, so the value is 3 and the solution is stable.

YOUR TURN

Reducing by dominance

For the same game, rows (3, 5, 2) and (6, 1, 4), show that one column can be deleted and state what is left.

Show the working

Compare C1 with C3: the entries are 3 and 6 against 2 and 4.

The column player wants small numbers, and 2 < 3 with 4 < 6, so C3 dominates C1.

C1 would never be chosen, so delete it.

What remains is the two by two game with rows (5, 2) and (1, 4), which still has no saddle point and needs a mixed strategy.

THE EXAM BIT

  • Say that the matrix is written from the row player's point of view, and that the column player wants small entries.
  • Write the row minima beside the matrix and the column maxima below it.
  • Compare maximin with minimax explicitly and state whether the game is stable.
  • Justify every dominance deletion by naming the option that dominates and the comparison in each row or column.

CHECK YOURSELF

A game has row minima 4 and 2, and column maxima 7, 4 and 9. Is it stable, and what is the value?

Show a hint

Compare the best of each.

Show the answer

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The matrix is from the row player's view: they maximise the row minima, the column player minimises the column maxima.

The game is stable exactly when maximin equals minimax; delete any dominated row or column first.

WORKBOOK

Printable practice for this topic: original exam-style questions with room to work, and a fully worked answer book. Free to use; please do not redistribute or sell.

CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

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  • Read a pay-off matrix from the row player's point of view.
  • Find both play-safe strategies and test for a stable solution.
  • Reduce a matrix using dominance arguments.

Open the full revision checklist to see every objective in the course in one place.

No animated video for this topic yet; these notes stand alone.